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ANTITRUST LAW
OVERVIEW
The Tenth Circuit's antitrust decisions of the past survey period re-
flect two trends in national antitrust analysis: confusion regarding what
constitutes injury to competition and avoidance of the use of the per se
rule in analyzing alleged antitrust violations. I In Black Gold, Ltd. v.
Rockwool Industries, Inc. ,2 the Tenth Circuit examined charges that a man-
ufacturer violated section 1 of the Sherman Act, 3 section 3 of the Clay-
ton Act, 4 and section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 5 Black Gold, the
most significant antitrust case decided during this period, is the subject
of extensive analysis in this survey.
Three remaining antitrust cases considered by the Tenth Circuit
during the survey period involved charges of conspiracy to eliminate
competition in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. In Blankenship
v. Herzfeld,6 the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Cir-
cuits in holding that whether related corporations are capable of con-
spiring in violation of section 17 is a question of fact to be answered by
the trier of fact.8 In Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,9 the
Tenth Circuit examined the per se and rule of reason approaches to
conspiracy to eliminate a competitor by unfair means and grappled with
the meaning of "injury to competition." Finally, in United States v. Metro-
politan Enterprises, Inc.,' 0 the court upheld a district court's finding of a
bidding conspiracy among contractors over several challenges to evi-
dence rulings and to the sufficiency of the indictment.'" Later in this
issue, this article analyzes how the Supreme Court addressed the Tenth
i. Under the per se rule, a horizontal restraint such as price fixing is held to be
illegal without any inquiry into surrounding circumstances. It is contrasted with the rule
of reason which provides that a restraint should not be condemned if it is reasonable, and
that surrounding circumstances should be considered in determining whether a particular
act has violated the Sherman Act. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60
(1911), for the first formulation of the rule of reason.
2. 729 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd on rehearing, 732 F.2d 779 (1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 178 (1984).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1982).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13(6), 21(d) (982).
6. 721 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Section 1 provides, in part, that "[elvery contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."
8. 721 F.2d at 309.
9. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
10. 728 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1984).
11. The court also dismissed an antitrust claim in Central Nat'l Bank v. Rainbolt, 720
F.2d 1183 (10th Cir. 1983). The claims were brought under sections 7 and 16 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 26 (1982), but were dismissed because of failure to prove
injury sufficient to meet the Tenth Circuit's requirement that the violations be proven to
be the proximate cause of the injury. That injury test was announced in Reibert v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
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Circuit's decision in Board of Regents v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association. 12
I. BLACK GOLD: PRICE DISCRIMINATION, ILLEGAL TYING, AND REFUSAL
TO DEAL
In Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries, Inc. ,13 the Tenth Circuit re-
versed a general verdict in favor of Black Gold, the plaintiff, on discrimi-
nation charges brought under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 14 The court also affirmed the district court's directed verdict in
favor of Rockwool on the tying claims, and reversed the district court's
directed verdict in favor of Rockwool on the charge of refusal to deal in
violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act,' 5 remanding the last issue to
the jury. 16
A. Background
Rockwool Industries (Rockwool) is a manufacturer, retailer, and
distributor of building insulation material known as rockwool. The ma-
terial comes in two forms, blown wool and batts. Blown wool is loose
rockwool which can be blown into existing buildings as insulation. Batts
are made of rockwool formed into thick strips and wrapped in foil or
heavy paper. Batts are installed as insulation during the construction of
new buildings. 
17
At the time the action arose, Black Gold was an installer of insula-
tion and a purchaser of rockwool from defendant Rockwool. Williams
Insulation Company (Williams) competed with Black Gold in the busi-
ness of installing insulation; it also purchased rockwool from defendant
Rockwool.18
Black Gold's claims against Rockwool arose in connection with a
program run by the Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC). The
program, which encouraged home owners to insulate, allowed PSC cus-
tomers to choose the type of insulation they wanted to add to their
homes. PSC maintained a list from which it selected, on a rotating basis,
qualified installers to fit the homes with insulation. Both Black Gold and
12. 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), afd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
13. 729 F.2d 676.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Section 2(a) provides in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality. ...
Where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen competi-
tion or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy,
or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly receives
the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them ....
15. 729 F.2d at 680. Section 3 of the Clayton Act is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
16. A petition for certiorari filed by Rockwool has been denied by the Supreme Court.
For a synopsis of the issues raised on appeal, see 105 S. Ct. 178 (1984).
17. 729 F.2d at 678-79.
18. There was at least one other installer of blown rockwool insulation, but only Wil-
liams is mentioned by name because evidence of price discrimination was only available
with respect to Williams. Id. at 679.
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Williams were on the PSC list of qualified installers. 19 The utility con-
trolled the program by setting the prices for the jobs and dictating the
brands of insulating materials that the installers could use. 20 Because
the only brand of rockwool approved for use in PSC's program was that
manufactured by Rockwool, both Black Gold and Williams depended
exclusively on Rockwool for their supply of rockwool.
2 1
At trial, Black Gold offered evidence supporting charges that it had
been forced to refuse PSC jobs and that competition with Williams had
been injured because Black Gold could not obtain the necessary
rockwool from the defendant. 2 2 According to Black Gold, Rockwool
had initially tried to force Black Gold to buy batts by withholding timely
delivery of the blown wool. Black Gold chose not to buy the batts from
Rockwool because they were being sold at a lower price to Williams.
Black Gold alleged that because it refused to purchase the batts,
Rockwool subsequently refused to sell Black Gold blown wool.
Rockwool admitted that it did sell blown wool and batts to Williams at a
lower price than it sold the same materials to Black Gold;2 3 it main-
tained, however, that this price difference did not tend to lessen compe-
tition, an essential element of price discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act.
2 4
B. The Robinson-Patman Claims
Black Gold alleged, in its section 2(a) claims, that it was forced to
refuse jobs because Rockwool: (1) sold blown wool to Williams at a
lower price than to Black Gold, (2) failed to make timely deliveries of
blown wool, and (3) eventually refused to sell any blown wool to Black
Gold, while continuing sales to other installers. The jury issued a gen-
eral verdict for Black Gold in the amount of $93,350.25 The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed this general verdict, adopting Rockwool's argument on
appeal that the price difference did not lessen competition as required
by the Robinson-Patman Act.
2 6
Rockwool also argued, and the Tenth Circuit agreed, that the trial
court's instructions to the jury were erroneous. 2 7 The instructions to




22. Id. This is an example of secondary-line injury, where price discrimination injures
competition with "any person who knowingly receives the benefit of such [price] discrimi-
nation." 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). Primary-line injury refers to anti-competitive effects
between suppliers at the same level of the distribution system.
23. 724 F.2d at 679.
24. Id. at 680.
25. Id. The award was trebled to $280,050 pursuant to section 4 of the Clayton Act
which provides that treble damages be made available to "[a]ny person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
.. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982).
26. 729 F.2d at 682.
27. Id.
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crimination in the unit price. 28 The instructions also recognized that
price competition was not the only type of competition possible between
Black Gold and Williams. 29 The court, however, repeatedly denied that
there could be harm to competition within the PSC program itself, em-
phasizing that PSC set the price for installing and applied the price uni-
formly to all installers.3 0 The court refused to affirm the jury's verdict
for Black Gold.3 1 It did note, however, that during the retrial on the
refusal to deal claim, Black Gold should be allowed to establish injury
occurring outside the PSC program.
3 2
The decision reflects both the Tenth Circuit's increasing reluctance
to award damages under section 2(a) and a trend towards limiting the
scope of the Robinson-Patman Act in general.3 3 It appears, however,
that the Tenth Circuit may have gone beyond the Supreme Court's re-
cent holding inj Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
3 4
On appeal, Rockwool charged that Black Gold failed to present the
jurisdictional elements of a section 2(a) violation3 5 or to make out a
prima facie case by proving probable injury to competition. 3 6 The
Tenth Circuit found that Black Gold did not prove that the lower price
offered by Rockwool to Williams had the requisite potential to substan-
tially affect competition. 3 7 Because PSC jobs were offered without re-
28. The jury instruction stated, in pertinent part: "The advantage may be given by
lower prices, discounts or other advantages, such as timely delivery given to the favored purchaser
and not given to others." Id. at 682 (emphasis by Tenth Circuit).
29. The jury instruction stated, in pertinent part:
In addition to price competition, you may consider whether Black Gold and Wil-
liams engaged in other forms of competition based on their ability to have the needed
insulation on hand to install when required, or based on their ability to provide the
services and quality of services demanded by their customers.
Id. at 682.
"[T]he jury could infer that installers were competing with each other on the basis of
their economic ability to participate in the PSC program at all, and to meet PSC installa-
tion standards within the margin between price and their cost for rockwool." See Black
Gold's Consolidated Brief: Response to Rockwool's Opening Brief on Appeal and Reply
to Rockwool's Brief on Black Gold's Cross-Appeal at 12.
30. 729 F.2d at 681. That the PSC program could not remove all competition con-
nected with participating in the program is demonstrated by Rockwool's assertion that it
had lowered prices to Williams in order to "meet competition." Brief, supra note 29, at 12,
21.
31. 729 F.2d at 683.
32. Id. The court of appeals also suggested that the court on remand examine the "in
commerce" requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act as well. Id.
33. See Rosner, A Year Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 435 (1983).
34. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
35. The jurisdictional elements of a section 2(a) violation require that: (1) the party
charged be a person within the meaning of the Sherman Act; (2) the charge arise out of
two "consummated and contemporaneous" sales transactions; (3) the same seller must
deal with different purchasers; (4) the sales must involve "commodities" within the mean-
ing of section 2(a); (5) the commodities must be of like grade and quality; and (6) inter-
state commerce must be involved. 4 J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 23.02[l] (1983) (hereinafter Kalinowski).
36. Id. at § 23.02[l] n.16. The three types of competitive injury include: "(1) sub-
stantial lessening of competition; (2) substantial tendency to create a monopoly; and
(3) injury to, or destruction or prevention of, competition with any person who either
grants or knowingly receives the benefits of the discrimination, or with customers of either
of them." Id. at § 23.02[2] at n.16, paraphrasing 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982).
37. 729 F.2d at 681.
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gard to price demands of the installers, it was argued that Williams
could not have used its ability to obtain rockwool more cheaply than
Black Gold to lower prices within the program. Therefore, the court
held, "the price differential on blown wool purchased for use in the PSC
program could not have adversely affected competition within the
program.''38
This holding implies that price discrimination is not actionable un-
less it affects competition through the lowering of prices. The Robin-
son-Patman Act, however, defines unlawful discriminatory pricing not
only as the lessening of competition and the tendency to create a mo-
nopoly, but also as preventing competition with a person who grants the
discriminatory prices, or "knowingly receives the benefit of such dis-
crimination, or with customers of either of them."' 39 In response to
Black Gold's argument that an effect on competition could be shown
even if Williams had not lowered its resale price, the Tenth Circuit rec-
ognized that courts have been willing to infer injury to competition in
some cases. CitingJ. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,40 the court
acknowledged that a competitor may be less able to compete as a result
of having to pay more for materials. 4 1 In Black Gold, however, the Court
found no "sales costs, advertising costs or collection expenses" in con-
nection with the PSC program. 4 2 Because the PSC program purported
to eliminate competition for jobs among installers by fixing prices and
offering the jobs on a rotating basis, the Tenth Circuit did not consider
the threshold question regarding Black Gold's ability to participate in
the program.
Under the Tenth Circuit's analysis, blatant price discrimination in a
program such as PSC's is exempt from scrutiny under the Robinson-
Patman Act unless it results in lowered prices by the favored competi-
tion. Such a result is difficult to accept, both in Black Gold and as a gen-
eral proposition. The factual evidence presented by Black Gold showed
that it was unable to obtain sufficient quantities of blown wool on a
timely basis, was forced to turn away jobs, and performed 1,252 fewer
blown wool jobs than Williams. 4 3 Ignoring these effects on competition,
38. Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a). See supra note 14.
40. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
41. "To the extent a disfavored purchaser must pay more for its goods than its com-
petitors, it is less able to compete. It has fewer funds available with which to advertise,
make capital expenditures, and the like." 729 F.2d at 681, citingJ. Truelt Payne, 451 U.S. at
564. See also Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 959 (1965).
42. 729 F.2d at 681. Thus, the Court concluded that competition was not injured.
The Tenth Circuit's understanding of competition seems to be limited to price wars. Sec-
tion 2(a), however, "is concerned with substantial impairment of the vigor or health of the
contest for business, regardless of which competitor wins or loses. The competition which
is sought to be protected by this section is a contest between sellers for the buyer's busi-
ness, because "competition is, in its very essence, a contest for trade .... Competition
. . .is a battle for something that only one can get; one competitor must necessarily lose."
Anheuser-Busch v. FTC, 289 F.2d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted).
43. See Brief, supra note 29, at 6. This ignoring of evidence of injury recalls to mind
the Supreme Court's warning in FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948):
1984]
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the Tenth Circuit concluded that Rockwool's price discrimination and
the resultant lower profits could not have produced the "effect on com-
petition" required to find a section 2(a) violation.
The "effect on competition" alluded to by the court was Williams'
lowering of its price to the PSC. As the Supreme Court noted inj Truett
Payne,4 4 the failure of a person to prove that its competitor lowered
prices as a result of his favored status does not necessarily defeat recov-
ery.4 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court refused to rule as a matter of law
whether a plaintiff must prove that the favored competitor used his price
advantage to lower his resale price.
46
J. Truett Payne established that automatic or presumptive damages
could no longer be based solely on the showing of a substantial price
discrimination. InJ. Truett Payne, the dealer sought treble damages pur-
suant to section 4 of the Clayton Act.4 7 The Supreme Court held that
the dealer, in order to recover, must prove a violation of section 2(a) of
the Clayton Act,4 8 and antitrust injury.4 9 The Supreme Court, however,
It would greatly handicap effective enforcement of the Act to require testimony to
show that which we believe to be self-evident, namely, that there is a "reasonable
possibility" that competition may be adversely affected by a practice under which
manufacturers and producers sell their goods to some customers substantially
cheaper than they sell like goods to the competitors of these customers.
Id. at 50. The Court in Morton upheld the Commission's findings of a violation, noting that
the Commission "found what would appear to be obvious, that the competitive opportuni-
ties of certain merchants were injured when they had to pay respondent substantially more
for their goods than their competitors had to pay." Id. at 46-47.
44. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
45. "That argument assumes that evidence of a lower retail price is the sine qua non of
antitrust injury, that the disfavored purchaser is simply not 'injured' unless the favored
purchaser has lowered his price . . . . If by reason of the discrimination, the preferred
producers have been able to divert business that would otherwise have gone to the disfa-
vored [person], damage has resulted to the extent of the diverted profits." 451 U.S. at 564
n.4.
46. Id. at 565 n.4. See also Note, Tracing an Antitrust Injury in Secondary Line Price Discrimi-
nation Cases, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 909 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court left open the
possibility that other factors may be considered in establishing a Robinson-Patman Act
violation).
47. 451 U.S. at 561-62.
48. The lower court did not deal with the issue of liability under section 2(a); the
Supreme Court, therefore, did not consider it proper to rule on the adequacy of the evi-
dence. 451 U.S. at 561-62.
49. 451 U.S. at 561-62 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977)). Brunswick held that for a plaintiff's injury to be an antitrust injury it would
have to be "of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent..." and "reflect the
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by
the violation." Id. at 489. The injury would have to be the "type of loss . . . that the
claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause." Id. (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Ha-
zeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)). The Supreme Court inJ. Truett Payne
stated that its decision "is virtually governed by our reasoning in Brunswick." 451 U.S. at
562.
The Court's clear tightening of the requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate effects on
competition may reflect the emerging conflict between the goals of the Robinson-Patman
Act and modern economic theory. The Act represented a Congressional decision to pro-
tect individual, particularly smaller competitors ahead of the consumer-welfare efficiency
goals which emphasize the protection of competition not competitors. See Tracing Antitrust
Injury, supra note 46, at 914-17. What is frequently forgotten by those advocating the effi-
ciency model is the necessity of protecting competitors in order to safeguard competition.
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) described the legislative history of the
[Vol. 62:1
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did not go so far as to disallow an antitrust plaintiff the opportunity to
establish such injury.50 Thus, the Tenth Circuit's holding that the price
discrimination and resultant lower profits could not result in anticompe-
titive effects without showing a lowering of price goes a step beyond the
Supreme Court's requirement that a court consider evidence of plain-
tiff's injury as evidence of a section 2(a) violation. Based on its un-
founded assumption that anticompetitive efforts could not be felt within
the PSC program, the Tenth Circuit simply refused to consider the
evidence.
After reaching the conclusion that there was no section 2(a) viola-
tion based on the price differential, the Tenth Circuit held that section
2(a) is directed at nothing more than price discrimination; hence, the
untimely and insufficient deliveries of blown wool did not violate section
2(a). 5 1 Even if Black Gold's claim was read as a charge of refusal to deal,
it would not constitute a section 2(a) violation because the "requisite
price discrimination between two buyers is lacking."
52
Black Gold also charged that the price discrimination by Rockwool
amounted to a conspiracy by Rockwool and others violating section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The Tenth Circuit held that if the discriminatory sales
were legal under the Robinson-Patman Act, they were legal under the
Sherman Act.53 Unfortunately, no case law is cited by the court for this
dubious conclusion. 54 As Black Gold argued,5 5 the fact that particular
discriminatory conduct did not violate the Robinson-Patman Act does
not preclude that conduct from violating the Sherman Act as long as the
other elements of a Sherman Act violation are established.
Robinson-Patman Act as making it "abundantly clear that Congress considered it to be an
evil that a large buyer could secure a competitive advantage over a small buyer solely
because of the large buyer's quantity purchasing ability. ... Id. at 43. "We think...
that Congress meant by using the words 'discrimination in price' in § 2 that in a case
involving competitive injury between a seller's customers the Commission need only prove
that a seller had charged one purchaser a higher price for like goods than he had charged
one or more of the purchaser's competitors." Id. at 45 (footnote omitted).
50. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
51. 729 F.2d at 682.
52. Id. at 683. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982) specifically provides that "nothing herein
contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods, wares, or merchandise in com-
merce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of
trade .... ." The inapplicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to refusals to deal is also
based on case law which has only applied section 2(a) when there have been two actual.
completed sales. See 4 KAuNOWsKI, supra note 35, at § 24.03[2]. As Kalinowski points out,
however, the legislative history makes it clear that this allows "the selection of customers
and not of what shall be sold to them." Id. at § 24.03[2] n.36 (quoting Representative
Utterback, 80 CONG. REC. H.R. 9418 (daily ed. June 15, 1936) (statement of Rep.
Utterback)).
53. "However, discriminatory sales that are legal under the Robinson-Patman Act be-
cause they do not tend to substantially lessen competition are likewise legal under Sher-
man 1." 729 F.2d at 683.
54. The Tenth Circuit cites only 2 P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 304(a)
(1978), for the broad proposition that the same criteria should be used in analyzing "un-
reasonableness" under the Sherman Act and "substantial lessening of competition" under
Robinson-Patman.
55. See Brief supra note 29 at 46-50.
1984]
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C. The Tying Arrangement Claim
The directed verdict for Rockwool on the tying charges was af-
firmed by the Tenth Circuit. Black Gold charged that Rockwool tied the
sale of blown wool to the sale of batts, violating section 3 of the Clayton
Act.5 6 The district court directed a verdict for Rockwool, finding no an-
ticompetitive effect as required by section 3.57 The court of appeals,
however, upheld the district court's verdict for a different reason. Be-
cause Black Gold had refused to purchase batts from Rockwool, 58 the
court found that Black Gold was neither a buyer injured because its free-
dom of choice was limited nor a seller injured by being foreclosed from
sales. 59 Black Gold alleged its injury was caused by Rockwool's refusal
to sell blown wool unless Black Gold also bought batts. What was miss-
ing, and crucial to a finding of a section 3 violation, was the actual sale to
Black Gold made on the condition that Black Gold buy another
product.
6 0
D. The Refusal to Deal Claim
Black Gold also charged that Rockwool's refusal to sell Black Gold
blown wool violated section 1 of the Sherman Act. 6 1 The district court
directed a verdict for Rockwool, finding no evidence of a contract, com-
56. 729 F.2d 678. Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits a person from leasing or
making a sale or contract "on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee
or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods. . . of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract may be to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
In defining "tying arrangement" the Tenth Circuit stated: "A tying arrangement is an
agreement by a party to sell one product only on the condition that the buyer also
purchase a different or 'tied' product." Black Gold, 729 at 684 (quoting Foremost Pro
Color, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 703 F.2d 534, 546 (9th Cir. 1983)).
57. 729 F.2d 684. Section 3 of the Clayton Act declares a tying arrangement to be
unlawful when the effect of the arrangement "may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
In a footnote, the Tenth Circuit admonished the trial court for incorrectly granting
Rockwool's motion for directed verdict on the tying issue. After stating the basic test for
properly granting a directed verdict (in the light most favorable . . . .) the Tenth Circuit
stated:
Under this standard, we do not believe the directed verdict could have been sus-
tained on the ground adopted by the trial court. Rockwool had sufficient market
power in the tying product, blown wool, because this product was the only one
approved for use in the PSC program. Thus the tying product was both unique
and desirable. Moreover, construing the evidence and inferences most favorably
to Black Gold, the dollar volume of rockwool batts tied to the sale of blown wool
cannot be considered de minimis.
729 F.2d at 684 n.6. For a discussion of the two factors that can establish an unlawful tying
arrangement, see 3 KALINOWSKI, supra note 35, at § 14.03[3].
58. Black Gold had purchased only one test order for $3,919.
59. 729 F.2d at 684-85.
60. Id. at 683. Rockwool's refusal to deal unless Black Gold bought batts was the cause
of Black Gold's injury, and may be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but is not
within the scope of section 3. See Black Gold, 729 F.2d at 685 (citing L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 168, at 488 (1977)).
61. 729 F.2d 678. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides that "[e]very contract com-
bination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states
• . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
[Vol. 62:1
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bination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. 62 Noting the difficulty in
determining when a refusal to deal becomes a section 1 conspiracy or
combination, the court attempted to explain the law on this question.
First, the Tenth Circuit recalled United States v. Colgate,6 3 in which
the Supreme Court clearly established that a unilateral refusal to deal
cannot violate section 1 because the requisite combination or conspiracy
is missing. Second, the Tenth Circuit showed that a purported refusal
to deal can be an unlawful combination if the producer goes beyond
merely refusing to deal. 64 The court stated that an unlawful combina-
tion exists "if the producer secures adherence to his suggested prices by
means which go beyond his mere declination to sell to a customer who
will not observe his announced policy."'6 5 The court continued, noting
that there are two ways to establish such a conspiracy: (1) proof by the
customer that he complied with the producer's anticompetitive practice;
or (2) showing that other buyers complied under fear of termination
although the plaintiff refused to comply. 66 Under this second method,
the Tenth Circuit found that there was enough evidence to send the
issue of a combination between Rockwool and other buyers to the jury.
6 7
II. TENTH CIRCUIT REJECTS THE PICK-BARTH DOCTRINE
6 8
In Mid-West Underground Storage, Inc. v. Porter,69 the Tenth Circuit
addressed the question of whether a conspiracy to eliminate a competi-
tor by unfair means is a per se antitrust violation or should be analyzed
under the rule of reason. Consistent with the general trend set by the
Supreme Court, it rejected the per se approach.
70
A. Background
Plaintiff, Mid-West Underground Storage (Midwest), was engaged
62. 729 F.2d at 685.
63. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
64. The court quotes extensively from United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
29 (1960). In that case, Parke Davis induced the retailers to adhere to the suggested retail
prices by announcing a policy to sell only to those who did so, and then involving the
wholesalers in the scheme by refusing to deal with them if the retailers did not comply. See
729 F.2d at 685-86.
65. 729 F.2d at 686 (quoting United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43
(1960)).
66. 729 F.2d at 686.
67. "We note evidence that Rockwool communicated its desire to its customers that
they purchase both blown wool and batts, and that Rockwool continued to sell blown wool
to Williams and another competitor, both of whom bought batts. However, blown wool
sales to Black Gold, which refused to buy batts from Rockwool, were terminated." Id.
What needed to be shown to prove Rockwool's liability under section 1 of the Sherman
Act was that Rockwool used the refusal to deal with Black Gold to induce other customers
to adhere to a tying arrangement. Id.
68. The Pick-Barth Doctrine is derived from Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell
Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 552 (1932). In Pick-
Barth, the First Circuit held that a conspiracy to deprive a competitor of a substantial factor
of commerce with an intent to eliminate that competition by unfair methods is per se an
unreasonable restraint of trade.
69. 717 F.2d 493 (10th Cir. 1983).
70. Id. at 495. See supra note 1.
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in the business of storing liquid petroleum gas (LPG) products. 7 1 Mid-
west's president, Melland, while still in a fiduciary capacity to Midwest,
combined efforts with a former Midwest stockholder (Porter) and set up
a competing LPG product storage company. 72 Midwest served a com-
plaint upon the defendants charging: (1) that Melland's conduct consti-
tuted a business tort under state law; and (2) that Melland, Porter and
various entities controlled by Melland and Porter violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act by conspiring to engage in unfair competition for the
purpose of eliminating Midwest as a competitor.
73
At trial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff Midwest on both claims,
awarding the company $250,000 on the antitrust claim and $3,911,637
on the state tort claims. 74 The trial court then trebled the antitrust
award to $750,000. 7 5 Three issues were raised on appeal: (1) whether
the lower court had erred in denying the defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict on the antitrust claim; (2) whether the court erred in not
ordering a new trial on the state law claims; and (3) whether the court
erred in refusing to enter judgment on the state law claims against the
defendants other than Porter and in dismissing a third defendant for
lack of in personam jurisdiction.
76
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Porter on the state
law claims in the amount of $3,911,637. 7 7 With regard to the antitrust
claim, however, the court found that the district court erred in refusing
to grant a directed verdict and ordered the district court to enter judg-
ment n.o.v. for the defendants. 78 The court's twofold reasoning de-
serves careful analysis.
B. Rejection of the Per Se Approach
The trial court refused to issue plaintiWs per se instruction to the
jury.7 9 Plaintiff, Midwest, argued that a conspiracy to eliminate competi-
tors was a horizontal restraint created for the direct purpose of exclud-
ing a competitor from business.8 0  The jury, based on special
interrogatories, found for Midwest on a rule of reason charge. 8 ' Both
parties appealed. Defendants charged that, even under a rule of reason
analysis, the plaintiffs failed to prove injury to competition.8 2 Midwest






77. Id. at 500-503. The court noted several difficulties with the calculation of this
damage award but upheld the lower court's refusal to grant a new trial because of strong
judicial policy in favor of upholding jury verdicts and the policy against an appellate court
finding abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Id. at 502.
78. Id. at 498-500.
79. Id. at 496.
80. Id.
81. Plaintiff's Reply Brief, Addendum.
82. 717 F.2d at 498.
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continued to maintain that it should win under either approach.
83
The Tenth Circuit attempted to answer Midwest's charge that de-
fendant's alleged conspiracy constituted a per se violation. 84 In tracing
the origins of the argument that a horizontal conspiracy to suppress
competition through the elimination of a competitor by unfair means is
a per se violation, the court began at Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Wood-
bury Corp. ,85 outlined the sparse judicial development after Pick-Barth,
86
and then announced that the Tenth Circuit had never adopted the Pick-
Barth doctrine and would not do so in this case. 87 The Tenth Circuit
cited Supreme Court cases,8 8 a circuit court case, 8 9 and a treatise dem-
onstrating why the per se rule should not apply. 90
The court's ruling conforms with the general trend away from the
per se rule. 9 1 Unfair competition is not the kind of business practice
that is characterized by a "pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue" 9 2 so as to warrant the application of a per se rule.
Indeed, as the Tenth Circuit pointed out, "such conspiracies may actu-
ally have a beneficial effect on competition by facilitating new entry or
otherwise decreasing concentration."
9 3
83. Id. at 496.
84. Midwest argued that defendants' conspiracy was a per se violation because "it was
essentially a horizontal conspiracy which utilized one of the conspirator's powers as presi-
dent of Midwest to exclude it from the competitive market for sale and leasing of substan-
tial amounts of underground storage [and because] it was also a form of indirect price-
fixing, and a per se violation for that reason as well." Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 36.
85. 57 F.2d 96 (ist Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 252 (1932).
86. Perryton Wholesale, Inc. v. Pioneer Distrib. Co., 353. F.2d 618 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 945 (1966), has been cited as the Tenth Circuit's adoption of the Pick-
Barth doctrine. Although Perryton did not use per se language, it did say that conspiracy to
eliminate a competitor distributor "destroys rather than maintains competition, is an un-
reasonable restraint on trade, and violates the statute." Id. at 622. Perryton specifically
distinguished cases where one distributor was substituted for another, thus changing the
identity of the competitor but not eliminating competition, and cases such as Perryton
where the "intent of the conspiracy was to eliminate the competitor predominant in the
area." Id. In Midwest, however, the court of appeals cited Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d
221 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829 (1976), which disposed of Perryton as "not
necessarily a per se case despite the citation of the First Circuit cases." Id. at 224.
87. 717 F.2d at 496.
88. Id. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977);
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972).
89. 717 F.2d at 496. See Northwest Power Prods., Inc., v. Omark Indus. Inc., 576 F.2d
83, 90-91 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
90. 717 F.2d at 496-97. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw § 828b, at 323
(1978).
91. For a recent analysis of the per se rule, see Lipner, Antitrust 's Per Se Rule: Reports of
its Death are Greatly Exaggerated, 60 DEN. L.J. 593 (1983). See also Northwest Power Prods.,
Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116
(1979) ("We thus reject the per se rule of Pick-Barth and adopt a rule of reason to be
applied on a case-by-case basis in situations where competitive forces protected by the
Sherman Act suffer some palpable injury."); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool
Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 561 (1st Cir. 1974) ("Insofar as Pick-Barth ... may be said to
stand for the broad proposition that unfair competitive practices accompanied by an intent
to hurt a competitor constitute per se violations of the antitrust laws, we do not now accept
their teaching."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
92. 717 F.2d at 496 (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
93. 717 F.2d at 496 (citing Northwest Power Prods., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91).
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The Tenth Circuit then culminated its rejection of the per se rule
with five additional reasons why the per se test should not apply:
(1) The definition of "unfair means" is so vague as to preclude review
under the Pick-Barth line of cases because a "bright line of illegality" is a
prerequisite to per se analysis; 94 (2) The fundamental conflict between
antitrust and unfair competition laws and the necessity of determining,
inferentially, whether there is impermissible intent to eliminate competi-
tion precludes per se analysis; 9 5 (3) Congress did not intend antitrust
illegality to be determined by the unfair competition laws of the individ-
ual states;9 6 (4) Only the Federal Trade Commission, not private plain-
tiffs under the Sherman Act, has the authority to prosecute unfair trade
practices; 97 and (5) The ethical arguments against unfair competition
"are irrelevant to, or even inconsistent with, the economic considera-
tions on which the antitrust laws are based."
98
C. Injury to Competition Under the Rule of Reason
Having decided that the case should be analyzed under the rule of
reason, the Tenth Circuit turned to defendants' charge that the plaintiff
had not proved injury to competition. 99 The court reviewed the record
and found that the evidence could support a finding of injury to a com-
petitor but could not support a finding of injury to competition as re-
quired by the antitrust laws.10 0 In short, Midwest had failed to meet the
well-established injury tests.' 0 ' Thus, the court of appeals concluded,
the district court erred in refusing to enter a directed verdict for the
defendants on Midwest's antitrust claim.
10 2
III. ADMISSIBILITY OF Co-CONSPIRATOR'S STATEMENTS
In United States v. Metropolitan Enterprises, Inc., 103 the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court's finding of a bid rigging conspiracy among
contractors in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.i04 Eighteen
contractors had entered bids for the repaving of four sections of an
94. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing Northwest Power Prods., 576 F.2d at 90).
95. 717 F.2d at 497.
96. Id. (citing and quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940)).
97. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing I E. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS & MO-
NOPOLIES 4.3, at 137-42 (3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1976 at 35) and 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
98. 717 F.2d at 497 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Engineers v. United States,
435 U.S. 679, 687-92 (.1978)).
99. The evidence failed to show that the defendants' conduct "raised entry barriers,
increased concentrations or otherwise led to the acquisition or exercise of market power."
717 F.2d at 499.
100. Id. at 498. In fact, the court noted that even if it were willing to infer injury to
competition had Midwest itself been eliminated from the market or injured severely, that
no such injury to Midwest existed. Id. at 499.
101. Id. at 498 (citing generally George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders,
Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 562 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975)).
102. The second part of the Midwest decision addresses state law claims based on unfair
competition, loss of corporate opportunities, self-dealing and fiduciary breaches. See 717
F.2d at 500-502.
103. 728 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1984).
104. Id. at 446.
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Oklahoma highway. Broce Construction Company (Broce), after a se-
ries of meetings, "worked out a deal" with Metropolitan Enterprises
(Metropolitan) whereby Broce was to subcontract the northernmost of
the four sections to Metropolitan if Metropolitan agreed to stay out of
the bidding. Broce subsequently received all four contracts and subcon-
tracted the northernmost section to Metropolitan.
0 5
A. The Hearsay Rule and the Co-conspiracy Exception
At trial, following the grand jury indictment charging Metropolitan
and its president with conspiracy to rig bids in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act, 10 6 the jury found both Metropolitan and its president
guilty. Metropolitan's president, Kavanaugh, was sentenced to two
years in prison and fined $25,000.I07 Metropolitan was fined
$75,000.108
On appeal, Kavanaugh and Metropolitan charged that the district
court had erred in admitting the testimony of two witnesses, and that the
prosecution had failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence and
independent of the admitted statements of the co-conspirators, that
Kavanaugh and others were participants in the conspiracy.
10 9
As to the admission of the statements of the co-conspirators, the
court of appeals noted that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if it
is offered against a party and is a statement by a co-conspirator made
during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy."l 0 The court
reviewed the record, and held that the district court had been aware of
and followed what is known as the "preferred order of proof' proce-
dure I I in deciding whether to admit hearsay statements of co-conspira-
tors." l 2 The court, after examining the evidence, upheld the lower
court's finding that Kavanaugh and Metropolitan were guilty of inten-
tionally participating in a conspiracy to rig bids.' '
3
On appeal, the appellants, Kavanaugh and Metropolitan, also
charged error in the instructions to the jury because the instructions did
not sufficiently inform the jury that it is lawful for competitors to obtain
105. Id. at 445-46.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). The indictment also contained two counts of mail fraud in
connection with the conspiracy.
107. 728 F.2d at 446.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 448 (emphasis added). See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
111. The "preferred order of proof," outlined in United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
1313 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980), provides that: (1) the judge deter-
mines admissibility of the co-conspirators' statements; (2) the court makes a threshold
determination based on independent evidence; (3) where possible, the government must
introduce independent proof of the conspiracy first and the defendants' connection with
the conspiracy second, before admitting the hearsay; and (4) the court determines
whether, independent of the hearsay statements, (a) a conspiracy existed; (b) that co-con-
spirator and defendant were members of the conspiracy; and (c) the statement was made
during course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. 728 F.2d 448-49.
112. 728 F.2d at 450.
113. Id.
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or exchange information concerning prospective bids.' 14 The Tenth
Circuit, reviewing the instructions as a whole,' 15 found that the instruc-
tions given were adequate to enable the jury to find a violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.
1 16
The last challenge of appellants was that the first count of the in-
dictment failed to allege the requisite anticompetitive intent or knowl-
edge to state an offense under section 1. The court of appeals found
that the indictment adequately apprised appellants of their participation
in a conspiracy, and that the requisite intent and knowledge was implicit
in the charge of conspiracy. 1 17 The Tenth Circuit thus upheld the lower
court, relying on United States v. Gypsum. 1 18 Gypsum held that intent is a
necessary element of a criminal antitrust violation' 19 but that a "re-
quirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but also
of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the law
would [be] . . .unduly burdensome. . . . [Tjhe perpetrator's knowl-
edge of the anticipated consequences is a sufficient predicate for a find-
ing of criminal intent."' 120 Furthermore, in Schnautz v. United States,'
2 1
the Fifth Circuit held that the mere failure of the indictment to use the
words "unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully" did not render the indict-
ment insufficient.' 2 2 Thus, the Tenth Circuit in Metropolitan concluded
that the appellants, upon a reading of the indictment outlining the ele-
ments of the conspiracy offense charged, should have been able to pre-
pare their defense despite the omission of the word "intent."'
12 3
IV. CONSPIRING ENTITIES UNDER SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
In Blankenship v. Herzfeld (Herzfeld I),124 the Tenth Circuit joined
the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits in holding that the determina-
tion of whether related corporations are capable of conspiring in viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act "is a question of fact to be
answered under the circumstances of each case." 12 5 The Tenth Circuit
then deferred to the district court's determination that the defendant
businesses were not separate business organizations capable of conspir-
ing under the Sherman Act.
12 6
114. Id. at 451.
115. This is the standard set forth in several Tenth Circuit cases including United
States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 105 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1980).
116. 728 F.2d 452.
117. Id.
118. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
119. Id. at 443.
120. Id. at 446.
121. 263 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 910 (1959).
122. 263 F.2d at 529.
123. 728 F.2d at 453.
124. 721 F.2d 306 (10th Cir. 1983). The bulk of this case is set forth and decided in
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1981) (Herzfeld I).
125. 721 F.2d 309 (quoting Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588 (8th Cir.
1981)).
126. 721 F.2d at 310.
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In the earlier Herzfeld decision (Herzfeld /),i27 the court had noted
that the defendants shared common ownership and officers, had no pre-
vious history of competition among themselves and essentially "en-
gaged in mutually advantageous business practices."1 2 8 Noting that the
other circuit courts of appeal had drawn differing conclusions as to when
"legally distinct" but "economically related" units should be considered
one actor for section 1 analysis,' 29 the court remanded Herzfeld for a
decision on this issue. 130 On remand, the lower court found that the
defendants constituted a single enterprise.
In Herzfeld II, the Tenth Circuit soundly followed the trend in other
circuits that disregards the "incorporation test,"'31 formerly applied by
the Supreme Court, and, instead, favors a less formalistic "functional
test."' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit cited one of its former decisions which had
noted that "antitrust defendants with separate legal labels . . . are not
always capable of conspiring; they must be separate economic entities in
substance as well."'
133
Had the Tenth Circuit waited another seven months for the
Supreme Court's June 1984 decision in Copperweld Corp. v. Independence
Tube Corp.,'1 4 the court's job in Herzfeld would have been considerably
easier. In Copperweld, the Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, a
parent and its wholly owned subsidiary are incapable of conspiring with
each other for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' 3 5 Although
the Herzfeld defendants do not represent a clean "parent-subsidiary"
grouping, the reasoning of the Supreme Court's decision-that a parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary have the same objectives, are guided by
a single corporate consciousness, and in "agreeing to a course of ac-
tion," are not joining previously disparate economic resources-would
have sustained a finding that the Herzfeld defendants were incapable of
conspiring with each other.'
3 6
Christine O'Connor
127. 661 F.2d 840 (1981).
128. 721 F.2d at 310 (citing Rec., vol. I, at 77).
129. 721 F.2d at 309. See, e.g., Ogilvie v. Fotomat Corp., 641 F.2d 581, 588 (8th Cir.
1981).
130. Id. at 308-09.
131. The incorporation test suggests that when corporate subdivisions are incorpo-
rated separately, they can be treated as separate entities for the purpose of applying sec-
tion 1. See Comment, Intraenterprise Antitrust Conspiracy: a Decision-making Approach, 71
CALIF. L. REV. 1732 (1983). This incorporation test was resoundingly rejected in Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 52 U.S.L.W. 4821 (June 19, 1984).
132. The functional test examines the relationship between the entities to determine
whether they are capable of conspiring to restrain trade. See 721 F.2d at 309.
133. 721 F.2d at 309 (citing Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 347 (1983)).
134. 52 U.S.L.W. 4821 (June 19, 1984).
135. Id. at 4828.
136. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Copperweld, "the very notion ofan agreement
in Sherman Act terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks meaning." 52
U.S.L.W. at 4826.
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